

**Globalization, NGOs and Multi-Sectoral Relations**

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## **Abstract**

This paper seeks to make sense of the impact of globalization on nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations. We argue that globalization processes have contributed to the rising numbers and influence of NGOs in many countries, and particularly in the international arena. International NGOs and NGO alliances are emerging as increasingly influential players in international decision-making, and we discuss some of the roles they can be expected to play in the future. We consider whether the emergence of domestic and international NGOs as important policy makers strengthens or weakens the future of democratic accountability, and we suggest several patterns of interaction among civil society, government and business in future governance issues.

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## **Introduction**

The recent WTO meeting in Seattle produced a remarkable spectacle for those interested in the processes of "globalization" and "governance", and the role of nongovernmental organizations in shaping international governance. On one hand, there was the WTO: an emergent international institution that convened the world's economic ministers to negotiate the trade agreements that would allow money, goods, and people to wash across the boundaries of the international political system. Much was at stake in these agreements for the world's countries and their citizens. Their structure would channel the courses of Schumpeter's "gale of creative destruction" across the world.<sup>1</sup> The economic, cultural and political fortunes of countries and their inhabitants would be buffeted by the powerful transnational forces. Traditional cultures would flourish or be shoved aside. Natural resources would be preserved or extracted. The poverty of billions might be alleviated or intensified by the distribution of expanding wealth and opportunity.

Despite the magnitude of the stakes and the range of the stakeholders affected, the meetings had few of the distinguishing characteristics of democratic policy making. The WTO itself was simply a collection of governments that had come together to negotiate economic trade agreements. There was no sovereign power or authority to be wielded; only the pressure to collaborate for mutual advantage as perceived by the participants. If any important decisions were made, they would be made through negotiated agreements. The discussions would be highly

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<sup>1</sup> Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1950) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 3d edition (New York, Harper and Row, 1950) p.84.

technical -- of intense interest to some, but mostly un-interpretable by ordinary citizens. It was expected that the ministers would do their business, and then go home.

And then, , the citizens of the world showed up to ask questions of these ministers and their meeting. Some 1300 groups—committed to varied visions of the public interest—assembled in Seattle to ask questions, make protests, and impose demands on the conferees. By the time the tear gas cleared, a reality recognized by many international actors for years had become highly visible to the U.S. public and the rest of the world: Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society alliances organized to achieve public purposes have become players in international governance..

Of course, neither globalization, nor a form of international governance, nor the emergence of a kind of transnational civil society undergirded by nongovernmental organizations are entirely new. Globalization (understood as the thickening of the networks of interdependence spanning international boundaries that accompanies increasingly rapid and inexpensive movement of information, ideas, money, goods and people across those boundaries<sup>2</sup>) has been increasing for centuries. NGOs and civil society alliances have also been active in international governance and policy-making for many years. Anti-slavery and women's rights advocates, for example, have build international NGO alliances to shape national and international policies for many decades.<sup>3</sup>

What *is* new is the recent explosion in numbers, activity, and visibility of international initiatives by civil society actors on a variety of issues, at least in part linked to the rapid expansion of globalization of communication, transportation, and production. Indeed, it

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<sup>2</sup> See Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Joseph. (2000), Power, Interdependence, and Globalism, in *Power and Interdependence*, Addison-Wesley, forthcoming.

<sup>3</sup> See Keck, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). *Activists without Borders*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

seems important that accelerated globalization has apparently coincided with the blossoming of civil society groups across the globe. The talent and instinct for voluntary association to address social problems is increasingly visible in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and in the transitioning countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Socialist Republic. Citizens associations have emerged to solve local problems, to provide needed services, to press for better government, to ally with like-minded groups from other societies, and to reshape the emergent processes of international governance.

An important question is whether the blossoming of civil society at both national and international levels is merely co-incident with globalization, or whether there is something about the processes of globalization that spawns these enterprises. An equally important question is what impact these enterprises can be expected to have on the processes of globalization themselves. Will they tend to accelerate globalization by effacing national boundaries and uniting people in common ideological commitments? Or, will they impede globalization by allowing those who feel pressured by the process to develop new enclaves which can be defended against global trends? A third question is what impact these organizations can be expected to have on the quality of governance at both the national and international level. Will such organizations strengthen democratic accountability and make governments more responsive to the will of their peoples, and can they help citizens deal with the pressures of marketization and the growing power of corporate actors? Or will they become agents for the more or less idiosyncratic social goals of the social entrepreneurs who found NGOs and the aid organizations and foundations that support them?

The purpose of this paper is to try to make sense of this new world in which economic, cultural, and political processes wash over national boundaries; that is, in which "globalization" is a

powerful trend shaping the lives of nations, their inhabitants, and the global commons. More particularly, the aim is to begin to try to understand how a new class of economic, cultural, and political actors -- civil society organizations -- are being shaped by, and are themselves shaping the processes of globalization, and what their implications might be for the quality of governance at both national and international levels in the years ahead.

We will argue in this chapter that globalization processes have contributed to the rising numbers and influence of NGOs in many countries, and particularly in the international arena.

International NGOs and NGO alliances are emerging as increasingly influential players in international decision-making, and we will discuss some of the roles they can be expected to play in the future. We will also briefly consider whether the emergence of domestic and international NGOs as important policy makers strengthens or weakens the future of democratic accountability, and we will suggest several patterns of interaction among civil society, government and business in future governance issues.

### **Globalization as A Multi-faceted Process.**

The thickening networks of interdependence created by increasing flows of, ideas, goods, and people across geopolitical boundaries "shrinks the world," not only physically (by bringing us into more immediate, insistent contact with one another), but also psychologically (by making us more aware of our similarities and differences, and our complex interdependencies).<sup>4</sup> This "shrinking world effect" shapes individual consciousness and action. And, as importantly, it shapes the ways in which individuals combine together in collective efforts to manage their lives and their circumstances. It attacks and undermines some institutional arrangements that have in the past done the work of providing to individuals both an individual identity and some kind of

satisfactory collective response to their circumstances. It stimulates the need and provides the opportunities for individuals to form new collective processes and institutions that can complement or replace the old institutions. In these respects, globalization is affecting both the demand and the supply of "governance" (understood as the processes and institutions that individuals, associations, and states create to manage their collective lives).

Globalization has intensified with changes in the international political system, in the international market economy, and in transportation and information technologies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has spawned an international movement towards democracy. Formerly totalitarian regimes that had sustained themselves at least in part by acting as allies to either the United States or the Soviet bloc were suddenly exposed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the cold war. They were suddenly vulnerable to their own citizens and their long suppressed demands for democratic regimes, and could find no help from the powers that had once competed for their favor to secure cold war advantages. The internationalization of the market spurred by the free movement of capital and technology in pursuit of both labor and customers created new wealth and optimism throughout the world, but also left those at the bottom of the economic and social ladder vulnerable to exploitation even when things were going well, and to dashed hopes when business cycles or economic mismanagement undercut economic growth. The rapid movement of people and information across the globe accentuated the grossly unequal political and material conditions in which the world's diverse populations were living, and stimulated a widespread demand for greater political and economic equality as well as a broader sense of our economic, political, and moral interdependence.

These changes have contributed to a shifting balance in the roles of the state, the market, and the civil society, both in individual countries and in the international political economy. In

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<sup>4</sup> Keohane & Nye, 1999, op. cit.

the past, looking at the international political economy, one would have conventionally said that the dominant actors were sovereign states. They seemed to be in charge of what happened within their borders. What happened across their borders—in the international commons—emerged from interaction among individual states. In the last decade, however, the power of the market has expanded and the role of the state has been reduced in many countries, in the West and North as well as the East and South. The shift to "open macro-economies" has reduced the power of individual states to manage their own economic destinies. And since economic destinies were often important in influencing the stability of political regimes, the vulnerability of political regimes to the international economy has been accentuated. In the face of the increased vulnerability to powerful economic forces that were shaping the world, and the inability of states to offer much protection, movements have arisen to provide some kind of collective response to the changing circumstances. Sometimes these have been grass roots movements in particular parts of particular developing countries. Other times, local grass roots movements have spread to become national movements. Still other times, local movements have made alliances with international organizations to help them achieve national purposes, or to lend their weight to international efforts. The emergence of international NGOs, networks, coalitions, and social movement organizations as potentially important political actors at both national and international levels has been stimulated by the need to create collective responses to threatening circumstances, by the generally favoring influence of democratic ideals, and by the collapse of national capacity to repress these efforts.<sup>5</sup>

Globalization provides information and perspectives never before available to many people, transporting them to new possibilities of international and cosmopolitan consciousness. The

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<sup>5</sup> Lindenberg, M., & Dobel, J. P. (1999). The Challenges of Globalization for Northern International Relief and Development NGOs. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 28(4), 4-24, and Mathews, J. (1997). PowerShift. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(1), 50-61.



increased flows of information and people contribute to a global homogenization (“Americanization?”) of tastes, norms, and concerns. McDonald’s hamburgers are available in Beijing and Buenos Aires, and language and music imports raise the hackles of cultural guardians in Paris and Singapore. At the same time, the assault of external ideas and values can inspire fierce defense of traditional values and styles of life. NGOs may express and help to create cosmopolitan and international perspectives and they may also express and defend the values and concerns of citizens alienated from globalized perspectives and cultural “imports.” Thus NGOs may express or enable globalization, and they may also ardently resist globalization in a kind of sectarianism within and across national boundaries (e.g., militant Islamic movements).

### **Civil Society and NGOs as Emerging Actors in the International Political Economy**

The concept of “civil society” has been defined in many ways.<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of this chapter we focus on civil society as an area of association and action independent of the state and the market in which citizens can organize to pursue social values and public purposes which are important to them, both individually and collectively.<sup>7</sup> Civil society actors include charitable societies, churches, neighborhood organizations, social clubs, civil rights lobbies, parent-teachers associations, unions, trade associations, and a wide range of other agencies.

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<sup>6</sup> See for example Cohen, J.L. and Arato, A. (1997), *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Walzer, M. (1991). The Idea of Civil Society. *Dissent*(Spring), 293-304; and Bratton, M. (1989) Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa, *World Politics*, 41, 407-430.

<sup>7</sup> Overviews of these perspectives have been developed by Wuthnow, R. (1991). *Between States and Markets: The Voluntary Sector in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, and Walzer, 1998, op cit. See also Tandon, R., & Naidoo, K. (1999). The Promise of Civil Society. In K. Naidoo (Ed.), *Civil Society at the Millennium* (pp. 1-16). West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Civil society actors can be distinguished from the government and business sectors on a number of dimensions.<sup>8</sup> While government seeks to provide public order and public goods, and uses its authority to raise the money and create the desired public conditions, and business works to provide private goods and services through the mechanisms of voluntary exchange, civil society actors seek to actualize the values and purposes of citizens and citizen groups through their independent voluntary efforts, as well as through the influence that citizen groups can exert on both business and government. If governments mobilize resources through legitimate coercion and taxation and businesses mobilize resources through resource exchanges, civil society organizations mobilize resources through appeals to values and social purposes. While businesses are oriented to private interests and governments are oriented to public interests, civil society actors focus on the interests of social groups within the society – including those groups disadvantaged by existing arrangements.

We are primarily concerned here with civil society agencies, often referred to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), that focus on issues like poverty alleviation, human rights, environmental degradation, and other issues of social, economic and political development. These NGOs carry out a range of activities, such as providing services to poor populations, building local capacity for self-help, analyzing and advocating policies that support disadvantaged constituencies, or fostering research and information-sharing.<sup>9</sup> Some NGOs focus on serving their members, and others focus on serving clients outside the organization. Some operate domestically, working on projects whose impacts may be felt from the village level to national policy to international arenas. Examples from the developing world include:

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<sup>8</sup> Brown, L. D., & Korten, David C., (1989). *Understanding Voluntary Organizations* ((Public Sector Management and Private Sector Development Working Paper No.258). Washington, DC: The World Bank, and Najam, A. (1996). Understanding the Third Sector: Revisiting the Prince, the Merchant, and the Citizen. *Nonprofit Management and Leadership*, XX(y), 203-219.

<sup>9</sup> See Vakil, A. C. (1997). Confronting the Classification Problem. *World Development*, 25(12), 2057-2070.

- The Grameen Bank began as a Bangladeshi NGO experiment in micro-lending to poor entrepreneurs who had no collateral for bank loans. After demonstrating that small groups who shared responsibility for the loans had a repayment rate vastly superior to ordinary borrowers, the Grameen Bank expanded its operations to serve more than 2,000,000 poor, mostly women entrepreneurs in Bangladesh, and catalyzed an international micro-credit movement supported by major donor institutions around the world.<sup>10</sup>
- The Narmada Bachao Andolan, an organization representing thousands of people “ousted” from their land by India’s Narmada Dam project, has successfully challenged the decisions of central and state governments of India and the World Bank to build the dam in violation of Bank policies for resettling oustees. The transnational alliance organized by the NBA has contributed to worldwide rethinking of the value of large dams, changes in policies and practice at the World Bank, and the establishment of the World Dams Commission to review the performance of large dams around the world.<sup>11</sup>

Both these examples describe initiatives launched by NGOs in developing countries that have expanded to affect international policies and programs. The micro-credit movement promises to foster grassroots participation in developing economies,<sup>12</sup> and the struggles over large dams have

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Clark, J. (1991). *Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

<sup>10</sup> Yunus, M. (1997). The Grameen Bank Story. In A. Krishna, N. Uphoff, & M. Esman (Eds.), *Reasons for Hope*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

<sup>11</sup> Khagram, S., *Dams, Democracy, and Development*, forthcoming; and see Udall, L. (1998). The World Bank and Public Accountability: Has Anything Changed? In J. A. Fox & L. D. Brown (Eds.), *The Struggle for Accountability: NGOs, Social Movements, and the World Bank*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

<sup>12</sup> Rhyne, E., & Otero, M. (1992). Financial Services for Microenterprises: Principles and Institutions. *World Development*, 20(11), 1561-1571.

produced changes in international policies and decision-making institutions that have effects far beyond any single country or region.<sup>13</sup>

Many other international NGO initiatives have been launched from the industrialized world. Recent efforts by an international coalition to ban landmines succeeded in creating an international treaty in the teeth of resistance by many governments, and a long struggle over sales of infant formula to mothers in the developing world with no access to safe drinking water eventually produced a near-unanimous agreement on a code of conduct for babyfood sales in the UN. Wherever they were initiated, all four initiatives ultimately involved active participation by NGOs and civil society actors from both developing and industrialized countries, and so tapped a wide range of information and perspectives on the issues in question.

NGOs that seek to expand their impacts beyond local and national initiatives faced significant organizational problems. One option is the establishment of an *international NGO* (INGO) that is organized to work across national boundaries.<sup>14</sup> Transparency International, for example, has member organizations in more than 30 countries that provide national support to the international initiative to identify and reduce corruption. A second way to organize for international action is to create a *transnational network* whose members share values, information, and a common discourse that enables them to coordinate their actions.<sup>15</sup> An example of a transnational network is the emergence of widespread linkages among NGOs and other actors concerned with environmental issues over the last two decades. Such networks allow exchange of information and strategies, but they are less useful for sustained coordination of activity or mobilizing large numbers of people for contentious politics. A third option is the creation of *transnational*

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<sup>13</sup> See Khagram, forthcoming, op. cit.; Fox & Brown, 1999, op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> The Yearbook of International Organization identifies INGOs as organizations with voting participation from at least three countries.

*coalitions* among actors to coordinate shared strategies and tactics for influencing intentional decision-makers.<sup>16</sup> A coalition among national and international environmental NGOs and directors of the World Bank produced a reform in the Bank's information access policies as well as the creation of an Inspection Panel to investigate complaints about impacts of Bank projects.<sup>17</sup> Finally a fourth organizational form, *transnational social movement organizations*, links actors with shared purposes across countries to mobilize members for contentious action on behalf of shared goals. This is the most demanding form of international civil society organization, and remains relatively rare.<sup>18</sup> The international women's movement comes close to being a transnational social movement, at least on some issues where it can mobilize members to challenge opponents in several countries. The different organizational forms offer different capacities for international action as well as increasing demands for coordination of resources and commitments.

While civil society organizations are not a new phenomenon, there has been a dramatic increase in their importance in many arenas over the last two decades. This change has been characterized by at least one researcher as a "global associational revolution" that may as important to the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as the rise of the nation state was a century earlier.<sup>19</sup> By the count of the Yearbook of International Organizations, the number of international NGOs has grown more than fourfold in the last decade.<sup>20</sup> While there is a great deal of variance in the size and activity of the

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<sup>15</sup> Keck & Sikkink (1998), op. cit., describe "transnational advocacy networks" that have played central roles in struggles over environmental policy, women's rights, and human rights.

<sup>16</sup> Khagram, forthcoming, Chapter 1.

<sup>17</sup> Udall, 1998, op. cit.

<sup>18</sup> Khagram, forthcoming, op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> Salamon, L. M. (1994). The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector. *Foreign Affairs*, 73, 109-116. The Johns Hopkins studies of the nonprofit sector in many countries has provided the base for comparative analysis across many regions. As one of the leaders of those studies, Salamon can base this assessment on impressive amounts of data. See also Salamon, L., & Anheier, H. (1998). Social Origins of Civil Society. *Voluntas*, 9(3), 17-46. Salamon, 1994.

<sup>20</sup> Economist, (1999). Citizen's Groups: The Nongovernmental Order, Will NGOs Democratize or Merely Disrupt Global Governance? *The Economist*, December 11, 1999; Boli, J., & Thomas, G. M. (1999).

civil society across countries, the sector is growing rapidly in many countries and regions. It is estimated, for example, that more than 100,000 civil society organizations have emerged in Eastern Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and more than 1,000,000 NGOs are operating in India<sup>21</sup> Civil society organizations are increasingly active in many different arenas.

In part the rise of civil society organizations and, in particular, development-oriented NGOs is related to the availability of resources to support them. The growing interest of foundations, international donors, and even governments in supporting nongovernmental agencies has made funds available and created incentives for entrepreneurs to create NGOs that can make use of those funds. The result in many countries has been a proliferation of NGOs that are organized more to take advantage of those resources than to accomplish their nominally value-based missions. Not all civil society actors are equally serious about achieving social missions or public purposes, nor do all subscribe to the values of tolerance, reciprocity, and nonviolence that some argue are central to the definition of civil society.<sup>22</sup> As it has grown, civil society has spawned a great diversity that is now pushing in a multitude of different, even competing, directions. Civil society actors, as will become clear below, can easily become confused about their legitimacy and accountability; they can focus on single issues to the exclusion of understanding the larger context; and they may be better at blocking than implementing large-scale initiatives. But they are increasingly influential actors in many circumstances.

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*Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, p. 14.

<sup>21</sup> Smith, J., Chatfield, C., & Pagnucco, R. (Eds.). (1997). *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

<sup>22</sup> Karina Constantino-David has described the variety of NGOs that emerged in response to changing circumstances in the Philippines. Constantino-David, K. (1992). Scaling up Civil Society in the Philippines. In M. Edwards & D. Hulme (Eds.), *Making a Difference* (pp. 137-148). London: Earthscan. Most analysts favor quite definitions of civil society actors that include many competing actors. Others, such as Tandon and Naidoo, 1999, op cit., exclude organizations that are not committed to core civil society values like tolerance, nonviolence, and reciprocity.

## **Globalization Impacts on NGOs and Civil Society**

In what ways does globalization affect NGOs and civil societies within nations and across national boundaries? While our main focus here is on *international* NGOs and the evolution of *transnational* civil society, we begin with a discussion of the impacts of the globalization on domestic NGOs and national civil societies. The reason is that international initiatives often have their roots in national issues around which civil society actors first organized – and then found that international initiatives were required to attack the problems involved. Even when international movements begin with international NGOs, they often need domestic NGOs to give them the political base and legitimacy they need to survive and be effective. And, it may well be that some of the most important effects of international NGO activities are their impacts on domestic civil societies.

### **Globalization and National NGOs**

Countries vary considerably in the extent to which civil society organizations are active in national life as well as how open they are to the impacts of globalization.<sup>23</sup> Some regimes appear determined to remain isolated from external influences (e.g., North Korea or Burma), while others are committed to control any non-state agencies that might be a threat to state power (e.g., China). When national doors are opened to information, trade, and travel, however, the impacts on civil society and its organizations may be profound. The torrent of information now available through media, videos, faxes and the internet can very quickly raise the awareness of people at all levels of the society about how others live, spread ideas about factors that constrain their own and

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<sup>23</sup> Salamon & Anheier, 1998; 1999

their neighbors' lives, and disseminate a wide range of alternatives to past practices. Increased consciousness about the wider world is almost inevitable.<sup>24</sup>

Exposure to this flood of information can challenge old beliefs and expectations, reawaken loyalties to old values and social identities, or provoke intense discussions of highly-charged concepts like “women’s liberation,” “land to the tiller,” or “ethnic cleansing.” Information flows that resonate with core social values can be the basis for the emergence of civil society organizations or social movements that speak with powerful new voices in national policy and governance processes.<sup>25</sup> These voices may be perceived to be particularly threatening when they are backed by resources from outside the country, such as international NGOs or coalitions.

Contact with the larger world may also exacerbate both the fact and the awareness of economic discrepancies. Economic stabilization can provide more goods at decreased costs to individuals with resources, and it may offer new jobs as corporations relocate to use cheap labor. But it may also result in layoffs of government employees in response to structural adjustment programs, marginalize groups dependent on declining exports, or demonstrate through business failures how difficult it is to meet the standards of global competition. When the “poor get poorer,” the clients to be served or mobilized by NGOs expand in number and in needs.

Globalization forces at the national level can reduce state controls over the economy, increase pressure for democratic accountability, or raise questions about state sovereignty. These developments can create political space for civil society organizations as alternative sources of

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<sup>24</sup> A major approach to adult education that has emerged from grassroots “conscientization” efforts in Brazil focuses on helping the poor conceptualize their political situation and the forces that keep them poor. See Paolo Freire (1971) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, New York: Herder and Herder. The growing omnipresence of television and other forms of information and communications technology can alter the political awareness of those whom in earlier decades had no idea about happenings in the wider world.

<sup>25</sup> Khagram, forthcoming, op. cit.



services once provided by the state, as watchdogs over and advocates for government policy formulation and implementation, as policy entrepreneurs or implementers with state partners, and as social innovators to guide improved services. When globalization expands political space, civil society actors may emerge to respond to the concerns of impoverished and marginalized groups that would remain voiceless under prior regimes.

It is not immediately obvious that political, cultural and economic facets of globalization will necessarily co-vary or reinforce one another. Globalization will not simultaneously highlight the importance of core cultural values, or open more political space for civil society initiatives, or create economic consequences that exacerbate poverty. Governments may open doors to international markets while trying to control the political implications of globalization, or vice versa. They may close their boundaries to cultural impacts as well. In general, however, the more open the country is to globalization, the more we would expect civil society organizations to become important actors in the country's development. This is a function of three factors: (1) globalization has impacts on consciousness—both liberating and counter-revolutionary—that are likely to be expressed via civil society organizations; (2) globalization is likely to place enhanced emphasis on the political ideologies of individualism, freedom, and equal rights for which NGOs are both a product and an exemplar; and (3) globalization invites in international actors (INGOs, international agencies) that actively promote and strengthen the emergence of national civil societies.

### **Globalization and International NGOs and NGO Alliances**

The increases of information flow, human travel, and trade associated with globalization have on the whole made the formation and operation of international NGOs and NGO alliances easier and less expensive. The costs of international organization and coordination have been drastically

reduced by the shrinking globe.<sup>26</sup> Globalization has also contributed to the rise of new problems to which international NGOs and alliances may be particularly relevant. The rise of transnational environmental problems, such as global warming, ozone depletion, and cross-border pollution, has sometimes severely taxed the capacities of inter-state institutional arrangements.<sup>27</sup> International NGOs and alliances have emerged to respond to problems associated with globalization in several arenas, delivering services and responding to disasters, analyzing and advocating policy alternatives, and promoting learning will be differently affected in delivering services, advocating policy changes, or promoting learning and problem-solving about new issues.

International NGOs and NGO alliances have been *responding to disasters and delivering services* for many years, and this is still the most common international NGO role. Most of these organizations originated in industrialized countries; many have branch organizations and large projects in developing countries. A recent conference of the eleven biggest international relief and development organizations (e.g., CARE, OXFAM) identified a number of challenges associated with globalization processes.<sup>28</sup> The end of the cold war, for example, has increased the frequency of intrastate conflicts and internal refugee flows, and public cutbacks have reduced the ability of state agencies deal with conflicts and humanitarian crises. Globalization has increased poverty in many regions, and declining development assistance funds have increased competition among international NGOs for resources. An important consequence of these trends is significantly increased demand for assistance, and seriously reduced capability to meet that demand. In short, for international service delivery NGOs, globalization is escalating needs for service while resources are declining. Many of these agencies also feel pressure from private and

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<sup>26</sup> Boli & Thomas, 1999, *op. cit.*; See also Keck & Sikkink, 1998, *op. cit.*, and Fox & Brown, 1998, *op. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> Young, O. R. (1997). *Global Governance: Drawing Insights from Environmental Experience*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

<sup>28</sup> Lindenberg & Dobel, 1999, *op. cit.*

public donors to become more “business-like” and “results-oriented” in response to widespread emphasis on market-based approaches to management.<sup>29</sup> In addition, the rise of civil society organizations in many developing countries is pressing international service NGOs to turn over local operations to Southern NGOs. This change threatens to redefine their primary tasks and render their staffs largely obsolete. The effects of globalization are thus pressing many international service NGOs to undertake fundamental changes.

For international NGOs and alliances that focus on *policy analysis and advocacy*, the thickening networks of global interdependence created by globalization have raised a variety of issues in which civil society have important interests. Some of these initiatives have formed initial organizations at the international level and then built alliances with NGOs at the national and local levels. Transnational advocacy networks concerned with the environment, corruption, and human rights, for example, have often been launched by international NGOs that later allied with national and local partners.<sup>30</sup> In other cases, national NGOs and social movements have built coalitions with international allies to influence national and international policy-makers. For example, the indigenous peoples’ movement in Ecuador sought international allies in a struggle over land reform,<sup>31</sup> and similar groups in Brazil allied with international actors to stop proposed dam construction.<sup>32</sup> In both top-down and bottom-up alliances, the processes of globalization have built awareness of alliance possibilities, enabled easy exchange of information, and contributed to personal contacts among key actors. The targets of advocacy campaigns (e. g., the World Bank) have often challenged the legitimacy of international NGOs that claim to represent

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<sup>29</sup> See Edwards, M. (1999). International Development NGOs: Agents of Foreign Aid or Vehicles for International Cooperation? *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 28(Supplement), 25-37, and Dichter, T. (1997). Appeasing the Gods of Sustainability. In D. Hulme & M. Edwards (Eds.), *NGOs, States and Donors*. London: MacMillan.

<sup>30</sup> See Keck and Sikkink, 1998, op. cit. for examples.

<sup>31</sup> Treackle, K. (1998). Ecuador: Structural Adjustment and Indigenous and Environmentalist Resistance, in. Fox & Brown, 1998, op cit.

<sup>32</sup> Hall, A. (1992). From Victims to Victors. In M. Edwards & D. Hulme (Eds.), *Making a Difference* (pp. 148-158). London: Earthscan.

grassroots constituents, and so contributed to building genuine coalitions across large differences in wealth, power, and culture.

A third focus for a growing number of international NGOs and alliances is *interorganizational learning and problem-solving*. In part these alliances and INGOs have emerged to respond to the emergence of global problems whose solutions depend on input from many different perspectives. The World Dams Commission, for example, is drawing on the perspectives of many different interested actors in assessing the impacts of large dams in economic and social terms. The International Forum on NGO Capacity Building has generated assessments of the capacities and needs of NGOs on three continents, and proposed joint problem-solving initiatives with donors and governments to respond to those needs. Easy exchange of information and engagements in consultations enabled civil society actors to identify and agree on the nature of problems, to explore underlying causes, to assess alternative solutions, and to agree on solutions and implementation plans across geopolitical and cultural boundaries that would seriously impeded joint learning and problem-solving a decade ago.

Such cross-cultural contacts often involve work across differences in norms and values that can set off highly-charged misunderstandings and conflicts. As value-based organizations, international NGOs and NGO alliances are often highly sensitive to such conflicts. They can play critical roles in articulating and synthesizing issues across value differences and so help to mobilize publics on international concerns and problems. The Global Network on Violence against Women, for example, has helped to identify and illuminate the common themes in movements focused on violence problems around the world—dowry deaths in India, female genital mutilation in Africa, spouse abuse in North America, rape and torture of political

prisoners in Latin American.<sup>33</sup> International NGOs and NGO alliances may be peculiarly suited to recognizing, articulating, and synthesizing integrative frameworks to contain values-based perspectives and conflicts that shape global problem-solving in the future.

### **Civil Society and International Governance**

Globalization processes are clearly having an impact on civil societies and NGOs at both national and international levels. Do those impacts have consequences for international governance and policy making? Recent research suggests that international NGOs or NGO alliances are playing active roles in the formulation and implementation of many international decisions and policies.<sup>34</sup>

They have shaped international events level in at least the following ways:

- (1) identifying problems and globalization consequences that might otherwise be ignored,
- (2) articulating new values and norms to guide and constrain international practice,
- (3) building transnational alliances that advocate for otherwise ignored alternatives,
- (4) altering international institutions to respond to unmet needs,
- (5) disseminating social innovations that have international applications,
- (6) negotiating resolutions to transnational conflicts and disagreements, and
- (7) Mobilizing resources and acting directly on important public problems,.

In these activities, international NGOs and NGO alliances have been building the attitudes and institutions for a transnational civil society that makes a different kind of international governance possible.

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<sup>33</sup> Keck & Sikkink, 1998, op. cit.

<sup>34</sup> Fox & Brown, 1998 op. cit.; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, op. cit.; Boli & Thomas, 1999, op. cit.; Khagram, S., Riker, J., & Sikkink, K. (Eds.). (2000). *Reconstructing World Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, and Smith, Chatfield & Pagnucco, 1997, op cit.

Civil society actors are often the first to use global information networks to *identify international problems* that are not raised or resolved by existing international arrangements. International NGOs involved in service or advocacy activities are often in close touch with otherwise voiceless populations, and so recognize problems that remain invisible to other actors. Since their financial support depends on public visibility of problems, they also develop linkages to media to raise public awareness of critical problems. Transparency International, for example, raises awareness about problems of corruption around the world and its impact on development. The Worldwatch Institute publishes a “State of the World” report that helps global audiences to recognize threats to the global environment. Raising public awareness of problems is often a prerequisite to action, and international NGO initiatives can create global discourse on emerging problems.

A second role for NGOs in the global arena is *to help construct international values and norms* that can guide future international policies and practices.<sup>35</sup> Thickening interdependencies are raising issues whose normative implications are unclear or diverse across cultures. International NGOs and civil society alliances can help articulate values and norms to interpret new problems, such as the issues of environmental sustainability, and in articulating practices, such as environmental impact assessments, to guide future policies. The construction of shared international values and norms is central to the creation of a global culture,<sup>36</sup> and international NGOs can be important catalysts for constructing parameters that shape meaning and interpretations in the shrinking world.

Increasingly during the last decade, transnational civil society alliances have been central to campaigns to *formulate and enforce global public policies* in response to critical problems.<sup>37</sup> These campaigns have often been mounted where existing institutional arrangements would not

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<sup>35</sup> Keck & Sikkink, 1998 op. cit.; Khagram et al, 2000, op. cit.;

<sup>36</sup> Boli & Thomas, 1999, op. cit.

or could not respond to emerging problems. For example, the International Baby Food Campaign focused on the marketing of infant formula in countries where the lack of safe water made the use of the formula very dangerous. That campaign eventually produced a code of conduct adopted by the UN and monitored for compliance by a network grounded in the original international coalition.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, the International Rivers Network has been critical to assessing the impacts of dams and pressing for global policies to limit their destructive impacts.<sup>39</sup> The alliances organized for these campaigns often became important resources to future campaigns on other issues.<sup>40</sup>

A fourth role for international NGOs and NGO alliances is *to create or reform international institutions* to improve response to global problems. The World Bank, for example, has been the target of transnational alliances concerned with reducing the secrecy of their operations and creating avenues for local stakeholders to protest Bank projects that violate of its own policies.<sup>41</sup> These campaigns can create more responsive institutional arrangements for the future. In other cases campaigns have created new institutional arrangements to solve emerging problems. The World Dams Commission, for example, is a product of a series of campaigns against large dams. It is systematically evaluating actual dam performance.

International NGOs may affect the impact of globalization by *creating and disseminating social innovations* that affect international governance processes. The demonstrations at the WTO meeting in Seattle are only the latest manifestation of the innovation of “NGO Forums” that have with increasing frequency brought hundreds or even thousands of NGOs to high visibility

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<sup>37</sup> e.g., Khagram, S., forthcoming, *op cit.*; Fox & Brown, 1998, *op. cit.*;

<sup>38</sup> Johnson, D. A. (1986). Confronting Corporate Power: Strategies and Phases of the Nestle Boycott. In L. Preston & J. Post (Eds.), *Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy* (Vol. 8, pp. 323-344). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

<sup>39</sup> Khagram, forthcoming, *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> Brown and Fox, 1998, *op cit.* Chapter 12.

international meetings in the last decade, such as the Earth Summit in Rio or the Women's Meeting in Beijing. These meetings place the discussions at these meetings under a global spotlight as well as afford opportunities for dialogue and advocacy to international publics as well as government representatives.<sup>42</sup> Expanded and thickened webs of interdependency across national and regional boundaries have facilitated the dissemination of micro-credit innovations from the Grameen Bank or policy influence strategies from the indigenous people's movement of Ecuador.

In contrast to their roles as spark plugs for change and confrontation, NGOs may also act as *mediators or catalysts for resolving conflicts* at national and international levels. NGOs have played a part in trying to manage serious conflicts with regional effects in Guatemala and Sri Lanka as sources of early warning or preventive action.<sup>43</sup>

More generally international NGOs and NGO networks have demonstrated the capacity to *mobilize people and resources for international action on important public problems*. In some cases NGOs play primary roles in identifying problems or articulating value positions; in others they take direct action to invent or press for problem solutions. NGO alliances were central, for example, in mobilizing support for the adoption of the international ban on landmines, in spite of resistance from many national governments.

International NGO and NGO alliance engagement in global decision-making and institution-building expands the variety of actors who are aware of and active in international governance. The civil society actors who went to Seattle broadened the issues to be discussed by the WTO by pressing for more attention to labor rights and environmental regulations. Civil society actors may

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<sup>41</sup> Lori Udall, 1998, op cit.

<sup>42</sup> Marty Chen in Third World Quarterly?

<sup>43</sup> Robert Rotberg, Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies; Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996.



also help articulate the values, norms, and critical inceptions of a shared global culture.

International governance in a globalized world is increasingly responding to a wide range of actors and interests.<sup>44</sup>

### **Civil Society and Future International Governance**

We have argued that globalization has contributed to the dramatic rise of civil society organizations around the world, though their impacts have been uneven across countries and issues. Some countries have been particularly open to developments associated with globalization—rapid communication and wide dissemination of information, quick travel and transportation, political democratization and fragmentation, economic dynamism and concentration of wealth, or cultural homogenization and polarization—that support the emergence of civil society organizations as important actors. International NGOs and NGO alliances have taken roles in service delivery and disaster relief, policy analysis and advocacy, and social learning and problem-solving.

We also argued that international NGOs and civil society alliances have demonstrated the capacity to engage in international debates that affect the processes and institutions for international governance. Past initiatives have increased access for international NGOs and NGO alliance to policy debates and institutions. But their roles in these forums depend in large part on how they resolve questions about their own legitimacy and accountability. This section will first consider the issue of NGO legitimacy and accountability in the international arena. Then we will turn to civil society relations to other sectors—government and business actors—and explore the possibilities for multisectoral relations in international governance.

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<sup>44</sup> See Jessica Mathews, 1997, *op. cit.*; Keohane & Nye, 2000, *op. cit.*

## **NGO Legitimacy and Accountability**

To advocates of both domestic and international NGOs there is little doubt that their emergence and growing influence is consistent with the ultimate goals of enhancing the quality of democratic governance and the degree of democratic accountability of international governance decisions and institutions. That result is fostered by the ways in which NGOs support the transformation of individual consciousness, enable newly-empowered grassroots individuals and groups to have a voice in decision-making, and enforce accountability for governments and businesses at both domestic and international levels.

But to many in centers of power challenged by NGOs—including international governance organizations, states, and national or international business organizations—the legitimacy of NGOs seems quite suspect. Behind the appearance of popular mass movements may be charismatic individuals supported by foundations with their own views of the public interest. Just whom do these NGOs represent? And should decisions that affect many interests and often billions of people be shaped or blocked by their actions?

Whether the emergence and active participation of both domestic and international NGOs in policy-making processes should be viewed as an advance in the quality of democratic governance seems to depend crucially what kind of claim they can make to holding both domestic governments and international governance arrangements to account. It is probably best to think of “accountability” as a relationship: To say that an agency is accountable is to suggest that there is someone who can demand that it live up to its commitments at the risk of sanctions if it fails to

do so.<sup>45</sup> Accountability lies in (1) the actor's commitments to another; (2) the substantive character of those commitments, and (3) the means that the other has to ensure that those commitments are honored. Some accountability relationships are hierarchical (e.g., principal-agent relations<sup>46</sup>) and focus on the accountability of the agent to the principal; others are more "mutual" in that they imply reciprocal claims (e.g., contracts that establish obligations for both parties). Accountability is desirable because it increases the incentives for actors to perform as expected, and that reliability can improve performance as well as the relationships among the parties.

Accountability is at issue in at least two ways when civil society actors participate in international governance processes. First, do international NGOs and NGO alliances increase or decrease *democratic accountability* in their challenges to international institutions that formulate and implement international policies or problem solutions? If those alliances represent the world's citizens (or even a substantial part of them), their interventions arguably may increase the democratic accountability of the target institutions. But this representativeness is a very difficult claim to substantiate. And international NGO alliances might actually reduce democratic accountability if they promoted policies that ran against the interests of their constituents.

Democratic accountability might also be grounded in the claim that these organizations represent transcendental purposes rather than particular groups or individuals. In this view, there are urgent rights to freedom from political oppression, from the threat of starvation or malignant illness, from the darkness of illiteracy, and so on, that are fundamental to human rights. Since democratic accountability has to be about a governing entity's ability to deliver on these fundamental human

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<sup>45</sup> See Mark Moore, International NGOs and Democratic Accountability, working paper July, 1999. See also Mark Moore, Toward a Normative Theory of the Nonprofit Sector, working paper, Hauser Center on Nonprofit Organizations, 1999.

rights. NGOs that align themselves with these causes are advancing democratic governance.

There can be no democratic governance locally or internationally when citizens lack the necessary conditions for exercising the rights and responsibilities of democratic participation.

An alternative claim to legitimacy is that the institution in question has failed to live up to its own policies and standards for practice. The transnational NGO coalition against the World Bank's Narmada Dam loan argued that the project failed to meet the Bank's policy on resettlement of people displaced by the dam, and an independent Commission of investigators ultimately agreed that those standards had not been met.<sup>47</sup> In this case the legitimacy of the challenge grows out of the Bank policies rather than the representativeness of the coalition or its advocacy of fundamental rights, though questions may be asked about its standing to raise the issue

A second important set of issues revolves around the *institutional accountability* of the international NGO or alliance itself—to what extent can other actors subject the alliance to sanctions for failure to meet its commitments? This is a complex question for international NGOs and NGO alliances, since their missions often commit them to serving multiple constituencies (donors and allies as well as clients) at different levels (local, national, international). Those constituencies often have very different capacities to impose sanctions for failures to meet commitments: Grassroots groups may find it difficult to influence distant international NGOs even when they are nominally part of the same coalition. Successful international NGO alliances often build “chains” of accountability, in which the influence and

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<sup>46</sup> See Fama, E.C. & Jensen, M.C. (1983) Separation of Ownership and Control, in *Journal of Law and Economics* vol. 26, 301-325]

<sup>47</sup> See Lori Udall, 1998, op. cit.

sanctions are transmitted across many links (e.g., local to regional to national to international) to span the organizational distance between international NGOs and grassroots groups.<sup>48</sup>

Accountability also turns on clear definitions of performance expectations by the parties to the accountability relationship. Different forms of alliance vary considerably in how explicitly goals, strategies, and responsibilities are formulated. Networks, organized around shared values and largely focused on information-sharing, create fewer foci for accountability than coalitions, which share strategies and action plans. Social movement organizations are yet more explicit about goals, tactics, and mutual expectations in the face of contention with powerful opponents. As transnational alliances become more focused on shared strategies and tactics, we might expect their investments in mutual influence and accountability to rise.<sup>49</sup>

Whether the engagement of international NGOs and NGO alliances promotes democratic accountability of international multi-sectoral problem-solving turns in part on the extent to which they develop their own capacities for institutional accountability to their members and stakeholders. The issue of civil society accountability and its importance for their future roles in national and international decision-making with actors from other sectors has drawn increasing attention from students of civil society and its international alliances.<sup>50</sup> These issues become increasingly central as civil society actors seek ways to work effectively with government and business actors.

### **Multi-Sector Relations: Civil Society, State, and Market**

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<sup>48</sup> See Brown, L.D. & Fox, J.A., (1998) Accountability within Transnational Coalitions, 1998, in Fox & Brown, op cit., 439-484.

<sup>49</sup> See Brown & Fox, 1998, op. cit; Sanjeev Khagram, forthcoming, op. cit.

<sup>50</sup> Michael Edwards, 1999, op cit.

Whether NGOs can become effective agents of improved democratic accountability and international problem-solving may depend crucially not only on how they develop and manage themselves, but also as importantly on how they interact with other powerful sectors of society that can claim to represent public interests and to pursue public goals. The experience of the last decade suggests that international NGOs and NGO alliances are more often effective in blocking decisions than they are in catalyzing large-scale action that solves critical problems. In part this asymmetry reflects the relatively low level of resources available to civil society actors, at least as compared to actors in the state and market sectors. In part it also reflects the different comparative advantages of the sectors: the state and the market are inherently better equipped for large scale initiatives, just as the civil society may be better equipped for small-scale local experiment and innovation.

There are many issues on which the different sectors can go about their activities without engaging each other. But there are many other issues on which businesses, governments, and civil society organizations seek to influence one another. Unfortunately, the gulfs in interests and perspectives that separate the sectors make intersectoral misunderstanding and conflict very common. Misunderstandings are particularly likely when the parties are also separated by perceived power differences and by ideological interpretations of difference. Civil society actors—especially those that serve disadvantaged or marginalized groups—may be particularly sensitized to power differences and collisions of values.

One general pattern of intersectoral relations that may emerge from disputes over interests and values is a kind of *intersectoral polarization* that is characterized by value-laden stereotypes, struggles over power and resources, and resistance to joint action even when some interests are clearly shared. In this pattern, each sector emphasizes its own interests and perspectives, sees little legitimacy or relevance in others' values, aspirations or resources, and seeks to achieve its

goals in spite of or at the expense of the others even when there might be significant gains available from cooperative action.

Intersectoral polarization can produce struggles to control decisions in domains where many actors have important stakes. Governments and intergovernmental organizations may seek to exclude multinational corporations and transnational civil society alliances from input to important international decision-making processes, even when they have critical information about the issues or large stakes in decision outcomes. Indeed, much of international relations theory focuses almost exclusively on states as the major legitimate actors in international governance.<sup>51</sup> In other situations multi-national corporations and financial markets may shape international decisions, and seek to exclude governments and civil society actors. Some analysts have argued that the recent rise of the international market has largely established that “corporations rule of the world”<sup>52</sup> and that governments and civil society actors have become largely irrelevant on many critical international decisions. Still others argue that international NGOs and NGO alliances now have the power to block many international decisions. While the enormous diversity and fierce autonomy of civil society actors make a coherent international hegemony on one or a few of NGO actors unlikely, some observers suggest that on some issues are already subject to a kind of special interest gridlock in which international NGOs and NGO alliances make international decisions and progress impossible.<sup>53</sup>

Some disagreement and struggle for influence among the sectors on controversial issues is probably inevitable. Indeed, some degree of contention is probably desirable for developing a thorough analysis of issues and generating creative solutions to problems. Analysts of conflict

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<sup>51</sup> See Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (1988), *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little-Brown; and Boli & Thomas, 1999, *op. cit.*

<sup>52</sup> e.g., Korten, David (1995). *When Corporations Rule the World*. San Francisco CA and Greenwich CT: Berrett-Koehler and Kumarian Press.

and negotiation have described several approaches to dispute resolution, including reconciling the interests of the parties, adjudicating the rights involved, or establishing which party has the power to impose their will.<sup>54</sup> These approaches vary in the costs they impose: Negotiations that reconcile differences are generally less costly than court battles to adjudicate rights or power struggles to establish supremacy. Adjudications and contests may be necessary when the parties disagree about what rights apply or who has more power—but those processes may also be costly in many ways.

Interest-based negotiation and problem-solving across sectoral differences has been used to generate solutions to a variety of problems in the last two decades in both the industrialized world<sup>55</sup> and in developing countries.<sup>56</sup> *Multi-sector cooperation* is characterized by mutual influence across the sectors and a willingness to negotiate agreements that take into account the concerns and capacities of many parties. In this pattern interaction among governments, businesses, and civil society actors can produce appreciation of each other's concerns and aspirations, recognition of each other's resources, and negotiated agreements that all the parties regard as fair and acceptable. Multi-sectoral cooperation has been useful for development purposes in very diverse settings. For example:

- In rural Madagascar access to market centers has been restricted by the lack of roads, and the government has had few resources for road-building or maintenance. With assistance from international donors the government has developed partnerships with local community

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<sup>53</sup> Economist, 1999, *op. cit.*

<sup>54</sup> These distinctions are explored in detail in William L. Ury, Jeanne M. Brett & Stephen B. Goldberg, (1993) *Getting Disputes Resolved*, Cambridge: Harvard Program on Negotiation.

<sup>55</sup> See for examples, Barbara Gray, 1989, *Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, and Larry Susskind et al., 1999, *The Consensus Building Handbook*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

<sup>56</sup> See Brinkerhoff, D. (1999). Exploring State-Civil Society Cooperation. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 28(Supplement), 59-86; and Brown, L. D., & Ashman, D. (1999). Social Capital, Mutual



organizations and commercial road construction firms to create and maintain hundreds of kilometers of rural roads. In the partnerships, private firms construct roads and instruct the community organizations in their maintenance; the government authorizes the communities to collect tolls from road users; and the community maintains the roads with their own labor and funds from the tolls. The partnership utilizes the comparative advantages of the different parties to produce gains for all of them.<sup>57</sup>

- The city of Cleveland, Ohio was a notorious example of urban decline in the 1970s as a consequence of outmigration of local industries, a series of riots and ethnic tensions, power struggles between business and government actors, and a variety of other factors. Local government and business leaders organized a variety of innovative multi-sectoral task forces and committees to explore ways to better understand problems, build shared commitment across many institutions and sectors to solve them, and implement the host of innovative initiatives that emerged from their deliberations. Over the next decade the city, once derided as “the mistake on the Lake,” emerged as an exemplar of urban renewal and reform on the basis of the joint initiatives that united actors from many different sectors, classes, ethnic groups, and cultural backgrounds.<sup>58</sup>

While multi-sector cooperation is increasingly common at the national level in many countries, it is not yet common at the international level. In part this is because cooperation across sectoral differences is intrinsically difficult, and parties are not likely to struggle with its challenges if the issues of rights and power—the alternatives to dispute resolution by reconciling interests in multi-

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Influence, and Social Learning in Intersectoral Problem-Solving. In D. Cooperrider & J. Dutton (Eds.), *Organizational Dimensions of Global Change* (pp. 139-167). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

<sup>57</sup> See Waddell, S. (1998) Strengthening the Road Network: Madagascar, Technical Report to USAID, Boston: Institute for Development Research.

<sup>58</sup> See James Austin, The Cleveland Turnaround (A): Responding to the Crisis, Harvard Business School Case No. 796-151.

sectoral negotiations—remain ambiguous. In the international arena it is often ambiguous whether appeals to rights or to power will be more effective in serving the interests of the parties than negotiating interests. In some arenas, however, long struggles among governments, businesses, and civil society organizations have established that the costs of adjudications and power struggles are likely to be very high, and negotiating interests has become an attractive alternative. Thus the World Commission on Dams, which includes representatives of all three sectors, has become an arena in which important policies and decisions can be debated and evolved, in part because it provides an alternative to a history of struggles that have been costly for many participants. As international NGOs and NGO alliances engage in more successful campaigns to influence international governance, the use of arrangements that enable multi-sector cooperation can be expected to increase as the rights and powers of civil society actors become better understood and accepted. Investigators from a variety of disciplines are already describing the rise of intersectoral cooperation in many settings.<sup>59</sup>

Governance grounded in multisectoral decision-making may further complicate already thorny questions of performance measurement and accountability. What criteria might be used to assess the performance of multi-sectoral initiatives? Is it important to use criteria that reflect core concerns of each sector in this assessment? Should other criteria be used that reflect value created across the sector? The following list illustrates criteria drawn from the market, state, and civil society sectors as well as a final cross-sector possibility:

- *Efficient use of resources*: Does the multisectoral initiative efficient mobilization of resources and information for effective and sustainable problem-solving?
- *Democratic accountability*: Does the multisectoral initiative promote responsiveness and accountability to key stakeholders in the issue?

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<sup>59</sup> e.g., Mathews, 1997, op. cit.; Keohane and Nye, 199x, op. cit.; Slaughter, A-M. , The Real New World, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, 1997, pp. 183-191.199x; Elaine Kamarck, Chapter X this volume

- *Actualization of core values:* Does the multisectoral initiative recognize, express and support core values and norms of stakeholders?
- *Social learning:* Does the multisectoral initiative promote better understanding and innovation that serves the stakeholders in the problem domain?

Multi-sectoral cooperation is difficult and expensive in time and resources. It is not appropriate for all decisions. But it may be more expensive in the long run to try to handle some problems without multi-sector participation. Civil society organizations and alliances increasingly will challenge and obstruct international policy-making that does not take the interests and perspectives of their members into account. Multi-sectoral cooperation can reconcile civil society actors' interests and mobilize their comparative advantages with those of intergovernmental agencies and multinational corporations in some circumstances, and contribute to more rapid and responsive social learning as well.

## **Conclusion**

We have argued that civil society organizations are increasingly important actors in international arenas as well as in many nations. Their emergence in the last few decades is associated with and in part caused by the forces of globalization, which have contributed to the personal, economic, political and social dynamics that give rise to stronger civil societies. The rise of civil society organizations has been uneven across countries, though openness to globalization seems in general to be associated with growing strength and diversity of NGOs and other civil society organizations. The growth of international NGOs and NGO alliances has also been shaped by globalization, with impacts particularly visible for providers of services and disaster relief, policy analysis and advocacy, and social learning and problem-solving. At the international level NGOs

and NGO alliances have identified emerging problems, articulated new values and norms, created or reformed institutional arrangements, fostered innovations in international practice, and helped resolve conflicts and manage differences. These contributions to international governance in turn highlight problems of democratic and institutional accountability of international NGOs and NGO alliances, and the possibilities of multisectoral cooperation to solve complex problems of international governance.

The growing recognition of civil society actors as legitimate and valuable actors in international governance may be a prelude to increased use of multi-sectoral cooperation to grapple with international governance issues. As governments and businesses accept civil society actors as representing real rights and wielding real power, the lower costs of reconciling interests in collaborative processes may encourage much wider efforts to work together. On the other hand, the potential reach and resources of the other sectors is potentially a significant threat to the autonomy and independence of civil society actors. Finding ways for all three sectors to work together while preserving their distinct identities and capabilities is an important challenge for the future.

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